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LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MIGRANT TRAINEES IN JAPAN:
USING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS TO EVALUATE
SHIFTS IN JAPANESE IMMIGRATION POLICY
SHIKHA SILLIMAN BHATTACHARJEE*
Japan’s steady decline in population since 2005, combined with
the low national birth rate, has led to industrial labor shortages,
particularly in farming, fishing, and small manufacturing
industries. 1 Japan’s dual labor market structure leaves smaller
firms and subcontractors with labor shortages in times of both
economic growth and recession. 2 As a result, small-scale
manufacturers and employers in these industries are increasingly
reliant upon foreign workers, particularly from China, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. 3
Temporary migration programs, designed to allow migrant
workers to reside and work in a host country without creating a
permanent entitlement to residence, have the potential to address
the economic needs of both sending and receiving countries. 4 In
fact, the United Nations Global Commission on International
Migration recommends: “states and the private sector should
consider the option of introducing carefully designed temporary
migration programmes as a means of addressing the economic
needs of both countries of origin and destination.” 5 “Most high* Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee is a Fellow in the Asia Division at Human
Rights Watch.
1 Apichai Shipper, Contesting Foreigner’s Rights in Contemporary Japan, N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG., 505-06 (2011).
2 Ritu Vij, Review, 64 J. ASIAN STUD. 469-71 (May 2005) (reviewing HIROSHI
KOMAI, FOREIGN MIGRANTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (2001)).
3 Shipper, supra note 1, at 506.
4 This definition does not exclude the possibility that migrants admitted to
host countries may be granted permanent residence. See Martin Ruhs, The
Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International Migration Policy,
145 INT’L LAB. REV. 7, 8-13 (2006) (providing a nuanced definition of temporary
migration programs as well as delineating discrete typologies of such programs).
5
Summary of the Report of the Global Commission on International
Migration, U.N. Doc. UN/POP/MIG-FCM/2005/09 (Oct. 13, 2005).
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income industrialized countries recognize a need for both high and
low skill migrant labor.” 6 Currently, temporary migration
programs exist in varied forms, differing with regard to the
mechanisms for admitting migrant workers, policies for selecting
migrants, rights granted to workers after admission and primary
policy objectives. 7
Any temporary migration program, however, “involves at least
some trade-off between the economic gains typically associated
with access to labour markets in high-income countries” and
“restrictions of some of the individual rights of migrants.” 8 For
instance, in order to align migration with sector-specific need,
temporary migration programs usually restrict migrant workers’
right to freedom of movement within the labor market of the host
country. 9
Migrant workers filling vacancies in low-skill sectors are
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. “[G]iven the wide
income inequalities between high and low-income countries,
migrant workers are sometimes willing to trade economic gains for
restrictions in personal rights to an extent that may well be
considered unacceptable in most liberal democracies.” 10 Examples
of low-skill occupations include jobs in the hospitality sector,
construction, cleaning, agriculture, food processing, and smallscale manufacturing. This paper considers whether recent policy
shifts in Japan’s trainee program are sufficient to safeguard the
rights of these temporary migrant workers.
Temporary migrants who have entered Japan legally under the
residence status “trainee” and “technical intern” form a subset of
the migrant labor force in Japan. In 2009, there were 80,480
trainees in Japan, a decline of 21% compared to the previous year,
likely due to the global recession. 11 Most trainees were in their
twenties and came from China (78.8%), Vietnam (10%), Indonesia
Ruhs, supra note 4, at 14.
See id. at 10 (discussing various forms of temporary worker programs).
8
Id. at 23.
9
Id.
10 Id.
11
This decline in 2009 reflects both a decrease in the number of foreign
workers newly entering as trainees, and an increase in the number of trainees who
transferred to the status of technical intern. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JAPAN, Basic Plan
for Immigration Control (4th edition): Provisional Translation, at 8-10 (Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/seisaku/keikaku_101006_english.pdf.
6
7
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(7.15%), the Philippines, and Thailand (4%). 12 The “trainee”
designation is part of a broader system of differentiation used by
the Japanese Ministry of Justice to categorize foreign workers
based upon their national origin and purpose for entering Japan. 13
In an interview with The Asahi, the director of a sewing industry
association in Hiroshima insisted that the foreign trainee system is
indispensable to small Japanese companies, who, without it, would
be forced to move overseas. 14
The original trainee program, initiated in 1981, authorized
young workers to enter Japan, ostensibly to receive technical
training in industrial fields, but in reality created “another
potential channel for the legal introduction of unskilled foreign
labour in an explicit manner.” 15 Not considered workers under the
Immigration Control Act, trainees were not entitled to minimum
wages, not protected by labor laws, and routinely subjected to
exploitation and abuse. In 2009, however, amendments to Japan’s
Immigration Control Act extended legal protection under the
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other laborrelated laws and regulations to migrant workers who enter Japan
with the immigration status “trainee.” 16
This paper uses international human rights instruments as a
benchmark to evaluate the July 2009 protections extended to
migrant trainees under Japanese law. The first section traces the
evolution of the trainee program from 1971 to the present, details
the features of the program that facilitate exploitation of trainees
and concludes with an analysis of the recent attempt by the
Japanese government to remedy the exploitative features of the
program. The second section reviews relevant human rights
instruments, including the International Labour Organization and
United Nations Conventions. The third section applies these
international standards to evaluate the recent protections extended
by the Japanese government to migrant trainees. Finally, the
fourth section concludes with recommendations for advancing the
rights of migrant trainees in Japan.
Shipper, supra note 1, at 515; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 8.
Shipper, supra note 1, at 506-07.
14 Philip Brasor, Immigrant Workers in Japan Caught in a Racket, JAPAN FOCUS,
(July 8, 2007), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Philip-Brasor/2464.
15
HIROMI MORI, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN 114
(1997).
16 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26-27.
12
13
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MIGRANT TRAINEES IN JAPAN

1.1. Evolution of the Trainee Program
The “trainee” category was first created in 1971 in response to
demands from Japanese business associations to import unskilled
foreign labor. 17 The initial plan was modest, importing only 5,000
unskilled foreign workers. 18 The current iteration of the “trainee”
category finds its roots in the 1981 revision of Japan’s Immigration
Control Act. 19 The 1981 revision allows low-wage workers to enter
Japan under the stipulation that they “are not permitted to deviate
from technical intern training activities.” 20 Under this scheme,
trainees are not legally entitled to work. Their compensation is
limited to commuting and living expense, and they are not
protected by Japanese labor laws.
In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was reformed drastically,
triggered by the accelerated presence of clandestine foreign
workers. 21 In 1992, the government instituted the Technical
Internship Program, allowing trainees who pass evaluations from
the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO)
to work legally in Japan for two years. 22 JITCO simultaneously
17
David Bartram, Japan and Labor Migration: Theoretical and Methodological
Implications of Negative Cases, 34 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 5, 17-18 (2000) (citing the
1970 resolution by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry urging the
government to explore the option of importing labor and the 1970 “Demand on
Next Year’s Labor Policy” issued by The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and
Industry).
18 See id. (discussing the limited nature of the plan, while making reference to
a Labor Ministry announcement that the intent was to import only 5,000 workers).
19 The Immigration Control Act was enacted in 1951, initially in the form of a
Cabinet Order. It became effective in 1952 with the issuance of the Law on the
Effect of Directives Concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The existing law
has been revised 19 times since its inception. Despite revisions, the principal
legislative framework has been maintained without substantial modification. The
1981 revision of the Immigration Control Act corresponds with Japan’s increased
dependence upon foreign workers in the 1980’s. See MORI, supra note 15, at 2, 32.
See also Keiko Yamanaka, New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in
Japan, 66 PAC. AFF. 79-80 (1993) (detailing demographic trends during the first
decade of the trainee program).
20
JAPAN INT’L TRAINING COOPERATION ORG., INDUSTRIAL TRAINING AND
TECHNICAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS: OPERATIVE MANUAL FOR SENDING
ORGANIZATIONS
62
(2009),
available
at
http://www.jitco.or.jp/download/data/okuridashi_English.pdf.
21 Yamanaka, supra note 19, at 75-76 (attributing the growing awareness of
the mistreatment of illegal workers to mass media).
22
JITCO, a semi-governmental organization founded in 1991, is a
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provided incremental increases in legal protections for trainees
who completed their first year in the program, 23 and allowed
smaller companies to band together and form associations to
collectively receive groups of trainees. Associations are usually
created by industry groups that recruit trainees in order to alleviate
labor shortages. 24 The practice of allowing aggregation by smaller
companies decreased direct oversight over trainee placements—
increasing the potential for abuse. Viewed as a whole, the
immigration policy reforms of the early 1990’s ostensibly kept the
‘front door’ closed, while simultaneously meeting the growing
demand for unskilled labor by allowing de facto foreign workers to
enter Japan through intentionally provided ‘side-doors.’ 25
1.2. Exploitation of Trainees
The flaws in Japan’s trainee program have been widely
acknowledged since the first decade of its operation. 26 The
underlying concept of the system, to transmit industrial skills to
foreign workers, implicitly places trainees in situations where they
are subject to exploitation. 27 There are few industrial skills that can
partnership between five Japanese Ministries: Justice; Foreign Affairs; Health,
Labour and Welfare; Economy, Trade and Industry; and Land, Infrastructure and
Transport. Overview of the System, JAPAN INT’L TRAINING COOPERATION ORG. (2011),
available at http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/index.html; Shipper, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 111). It is suggested, though not formally documented, that
many of those running JITCO derived their position through amakudari from the
various ministries mentioned above. See Brasor, supra note 14.
23
The Technical Internship Program (TIP), operated by JITCO, permits
trainees designated by JITCO to work legally for two years. As legal foreign
workers, they are entitled to receive Japan’s National Health Insurance and
Worker’s Compensation Insurance. See Shipper, supra note 1, at 515.
24 Hiroshi Matsubara, Training Scheme Exploits Foreigners, JAPAN TIMES (Apr.
7, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/2000/04/07/announcements/trainingscheme-exploits-foreigners/#.VBVDc0vMZFY.
25 MORI, supra note 15. See also Yamanaka, supra note 19, at 76-78 (comparing
Japan’s trainee program to U.S. government policy toward migrant workers from
Asia and Latin America).
26 See HIROSHI KOMAI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN JAPAN 37–54 (1993) (detailing,
inter alia, the poverty of working conditions and low compensation); HARUO
SHIMADA, JAPAN’S “GUEST WORKERS” 39 (1994) (“The problem . . . is the
tremendous gap between Japan’s official legal position on the acceptance of
foreign workers and the real state of affairs, and the absence, or ambiguity, or
regulations that might bridge this gap.”).
27
See Haruo Shimada, The Employment of Foreign Labor in Japan, in 513
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., JAPAN’S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 117, 126 (1991) (discussing how the trainee system can be
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be learned without actually performing industrial activities. 28 As a
result, by program design, trainees are made to work in industrial
sectors and compensated with a training allowance that is only a
small fraction of the normal market wage. 29 In 2010, the Japanese
Ministry of Justice reported that “the number . . . [of] trainees and
technical interns being treated like low-wage workers . . . has been
on the increase . . . .” 30
Misconduct by organizations receiving trainees is rampant and
well documented. According to Ministry of Justice statistics, the
number of organizations deemed to have committed misconduct
reached a record high of 452 organizations in 2008, and declined to
360 organizations in 2009—in part due to the significant decline in
the number of trainees entering Japan that year. 31 Nearly all
recorded abuses—358 out of 360 officially acknowledged abuses in
2009—took place in association-supervised systems of placement. 32
According to the Ministry of Justice, “some accepting
organizations do not provide adequate guidance and supervision
for their umbrella organizations, and there are brokers who obtain
unfair profits from intermediary services.” 33
The Ministry of Justice divides misconduct into three major
categories that account for the majority of recorded violations:
violations against labor-related regulations, including unpaid
wages; ‘work in excess of statutory working hours;’ and ‘name
lending’—the practice of allowing other organizations that have
not completed formal application procedures to accept trainees
and technical interns. 34 These three categories account for 76.6% of
all misconduct. 35
used to exploit foreign workers because trainees cannot be paid during the
training period for actual work performed, but instead are paid a lower rate
through payment of a training allowance).
28 Id. at 126.
29 Id.
30 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10-11.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs, in 2010
IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf.
34 Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs:
Response to Cases of Inappropriate Acceptance, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 90,
available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf.
35 Id.
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Organization misconduct, however, goes far beyond treating
trainees as low-wage workers. In addition to the three major
categories cited above, the government acknowledges a category of
abuse entitled “malicious acts of infringement of human rights.” 36
For instance, in 2007, six Vietnamese women in their twenties,
accepted by the Toyota Technology Exchange Association and sent
to a third-tier subcontractor, where they worked in the production
of vehicle seat parts, sued the subcontractor for withholding
wages, subjecting them to sexual harassment, and preventing them
from escaping by confiscating their passports and bank books. 37
Similarly, in 2008, three Chinese women filed a damages lawsuit
against two farms where, rather than receive training in tomato
farming as promised, their passports were confiscated and they
were forced to pick strawberries, work overtime without breaks,
and were even dispatched to other farms to work. 38
Most alarmingly, between 2005 and 2010, at least 127 trainees
(or one in 2,600 trainees) died on the job, mostly due to the strain of
excessive labor. 39 Under Japanese law, when a worker dies from
brain or heart disease and either their overtime hours were in
excess of 100 in the month before their death, or the average
monthly overtime was more than 80 hours for a period of at least
two months before their death, overwork (karoshi) is recognized as
the cause of death. 40 According to JITCO, “the rate of death of
heart disease of trainees and technical interns was almost double
Id. at 91.
Foreign Female Interns to Sue Toyota Subcontractor, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 9,
2007), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/03/09/national/foreign-femaleinterns-to-sue-toyota-subcontractor/.
38 Trainee Trio File Suit Against Kunamoto Farms, Agencies, JAPAN TIMES (Apr.
10, 2008), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/04/10/national/trainee-triofile-suit-against-kumamoto-farms-agencies/#.VBVDRkvMZFY.
39 Shipper, supra note 1, at 517; see also Simon Scott, Dying to Work: Japan Inc.’s
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2010),
Foreign
Trainees,
JAPAN
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/08/03/issues/dying-to-workjapan-inc-s-foreign-trainees/#.VBVCqUvMZFY (documenting the first time
Japanese authorities recognized that a foreign trainee effectively worked himself
to death: an official ruling from the Kashima Labor Standards Inspection Office
held that 31-year-old Chinese trainee, Jiang Xiaodong, died of karoshi—death from
overwork).
40 Scott, supra note 39 (quoting Hiroshi Kawahito, a Japanese labor lawyer
who explains that, while it is impossible to conclusively prove an instance of
death from overwork, if one looks at the overall pattern of a person’s life, it is
clear in many cases that the physical and mental stress of long working hours was
fatal).
36

37
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the rate for Japanese of the same age.” 41 The ratio of trainees who
have died from karoshi is particularly high considering that nearly
all trainees are young people who must pass rigorous physical
examinations to enter the program. 42
Japan International Training Cooperation Organization,
responsible for overseeing trainee placements, has failed to
intervene on behalf of trainees, even when abuses are brought
directly to their attention. 43 As JITCO has become increasingly
autonomous, the organization has taken on the culture of a private
company. 44 JITCO’s total income for the 2008 financial year was
¥2.94 billion and more than half this amount, ¥1.66 billion, came
from “support membership fees” paid by companies receiving
trainees. 45 Industry officials told The Mainichi newspaper that
JITCO treats them as customers and is willing to look the other
way with regard to common illegal practices such as confiscating
trainee passports and fourteen-hour workdays. 46 “One employer
said appreciatively that JITCO calls him beforehand to tell him
when they are coming for a surprise inspection.” 47 This lack of
oversight from JITCO has allowed placement organizations to
behave with impunity.
Under this system, foreign trainees and technical interns had
little recourse. During their first year of the program, Labor
Standards Offices could do nothing for them because the Labor
Standards Act did not apply. 48 After their first year, trainees who
achieved the legal status designation “intern” were technically
entitled to legal recourse under the Labor Standards Act but
typically had limited knowledge of the law and rarely brought
their grievances to the offices. 49 Alternate avenues of recourse
were also largely foreclosed. Although trainees could petition the
Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice if they did not
Id.
Shipper, supra note 1, at 517.
43 Foreign Female Interns to Sue Toyota Subcontractor, supra note 37.
44 Brasor, supra note 14.
45
Scott, supra note 39 (quoting Lila Abiko of the Lawyer’s Network for
Trainees).
46 Brasor, supra note 14.
47 Brasor, supra note 14.
48 Hiroshi Matsubara, Training Scheme Exploits Foreigners, JAPAN TIMES (Apr.
7, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/2000/04/07/announcements/trainingscheme-exploits-foreigners/#.VBVCVEvMZFY.
49 Id.
41
42
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receive any training at their firms, the Ministry could only penalize
the firms by suspending their permission to accept trainees—a
practice which resulted in immediate deportation for trainees
working at that location. 50
1.3. 2009 Amendments to Japan’s Immigration Control Act
In July 2009, the Japanese government amended the
Immigration Control Act, revising the trainee and technical intern
system. 51 The new system, effective from July 1, 2010, replaced the
trainee and technical internship categories with a new visa
category entitled “on the job trainee” or “practical trainee.” 52
Under this revised system, practical trainees complete a twomonth language and training program at the beginning of their
contract. 53 Upon completing this condensed training program,
practical trainees will become eligible as “workers” under the
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other laborrelated laws and regulations. 54 The maximum length of stay for on
the job trainees will remain three years. 55
The 2009 revision signals a basic recognition that trainees are
entitled to protection under the law. As of July 1, 2010,
organizations that have acted inappropriately regarding training
and technical internships will be suspended from the program for
three years. 56 In order to reinforce supervision of trainee
placements, a new Ministry of Justice ordinance requires the staff
of supervising organizations to visit the facility where programs
are conducted at least once a month to confirm that the situation of
trainees conforms to program guidelines. 57 In addition, board
Id.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26.
52 Although the “trainee” residency status still exists for foreign workers
who arrived before 2010, it is currently being phased out and, from 2011, all firstyear participants in the program will be classed as practical trainees. See Shipper,
supra note 1, at 545 (describing government revisions to the trainee and technical
intern system); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26 (describing Japanese
efforts to ensure appropriate training and technical internship programs).
53 Shipper, supra note 1, at 545.
54 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26.
55 Shipper, supra note 1, at 545.
56 Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry
of Justice, Japan, Points on 2010 Immigration Control, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL
90, available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf.
57 Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs: Actions
50
51
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members of supervising organizations must conduct an audit
every three months, and organizations are required to provide
counseling staff to advise technical interns. 58
Naomi Hayazaki, an advocate for trainees, who has been
involved with the Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK)
since 2000, links the July 2009 revision of the Immigration Control
Act to an increasing awareness by the government that the trainee
program was deeply flawed: “[W]hen we first started, the
government dismissed the problem as something only relevant to a
few bad companies . . . . [B]ut in these ten years, they have realized
that it is not merely one part, that it is a big problem. The change
in July was also a result of that recognition.” 59
The remainder of this paper considers these changes in context
of international human rights instruments aimed at protecting
migrant workers. Section 2 provides an overview of relevant
human rights conventions.
Section 3 delineates Japan’s
commitment to international human rights instruments protecting
migrant workers and evaluates the practical impact of the 2009
revisions to the Immigration Control Act. Finally, Section 4
concludes with recommendations for safeguarding the rights of
migrant trainees in Japan.
2.

INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKS: HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
PROTECTING MIGRANT WORKERS

Both the International Labour Organization (ILO) and United
Nations (UN) Conventions protect migrant workers. This section
begins by providing an overview of relevant human rights
instruments: ILO Convention 97, Migration for Employment
(1949); ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention
(Supplementary Provisions) (1975); and the United Nations
International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families (1990) (ICMR). Although most of
the rights contained in the United Nations human rights treaty
system also apply to non-citizens and thus provide basic protection
for migrant workers and their families, this paper focuses on
for Improvement of the System, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, available at
www.moj.go.jp/content/000058062.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Jody Godoy, Abuse Rife Within Trainee System, Say NGOs, JAPAN TIMES, Dec.
7, 2010, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/12/07/issues/abuserife-within-trainee-system-say-ngos/#.VBVBtUvMZFY.
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international instruments focused primarily on advancing the
human rights of migrant workers.
2.1. ILO Conventions Protecting Migrant Workers Rights
The Constitution of the International Labour Organization
clearly assigns the ILO the task of protecting “the interests of
workers when employed in countries other than their own.” 60
Accordingly, within the UN system, setting standards for
protecting migrant workers officially falls within the domain of the
ILO. 61 There are two ILO conventions expressly dedicated to
safeguarding the rights of migrant workers.
The first, ILO Convention 97, Migration for Employment was
adopted in 1949 and came into force in 1952. 62 Convention 97
consists of general provisions safeguarding the rights of migrant
workers and three optional annexes. Among other stipulations,
under the general provisions ratifying states are required to
provide migrant workers with accurate information on national
policies, laws, and regulations relating to migration; facilitate
migration for employment; maintain appropriate medical services;
prevent discrimination; and provide equal treatment under the
law, on par with the treatment afforded nationals, with respect to
remuneration, collective bargaining, social security, taxation, and
legal recourse. 63 The three annexes to Convention 97 cover (1)
recruitment and conditions of labor for migrant workers, (2)
government sponsored group transfer, and (3) exemption from
customs duties. Governments are given the option of excluding
any of the annexes from ratification. Forty-nine countries have
ratified ILO Convention 97 to date.
The second, ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention
(Supplementary Provisions), was adopted in 1975 and came into
force in 1978. Convention 143 has two substantive parts: (1)
Migrations in Abusive Conditions and (2) Equality of Opportunity
Convention (No. 143) Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers,
pmbl., June 24, 1975, 1120 U.N.T.S. 323 [hereinafter ILO Convention 143].
61 Roger Bohning, The ILO and the New UN Convention on Migrant Workers:
The Past and Future, 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 698, 700 (1991) (assessing the ILO’s
role in developing international measures to aid migrant workers).
62
Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised
1949), Jan. 7, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter ILO Convention 97].
63 Id.
60
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and Treatment. The first substantive component of Convention
No. 143 is primarily concerned with irregular migrant workers—
migrant workers who have entered a host country illegally
whether voluntarily or due to forced trafficking. Ratifying
countries are called upon to detect and suppress illegal
employment by prosecuting employers and agents who engage in
trafficking. 64 The second substantive component concerns equality
of opportunity and treatment for migrant workers who lawfully
enter a host country. 65 Ratifying states have the option of
excluding either part of the convention.
Despite the option to selectively ratify each component,
Convention No. 143 faced significant resistance when it came up
for adoption by the International Labour Conference. 66 States,
employers, and workers’ organizations from developing countries
objected to the Convention because it threatened to cut off
employment opportunities and foreign exchange remittances from
illegally employed migrants from developing countries. 67 Only 23
countries have ratified ILO Convention 143 to date. 68
2.2. UN International Convention on the Protection of All Migrants
Workers and Members of Their Families
The 1990 United Nations International Convention on the
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(ICMR) officially entered into force on July 1, 2003. 69 Intervening
in the conflict between state sovereignty and human rights, the
ICMR defines the category migrant worker, clarifies the full
application of human rights law to migrant workers, and traces the
rights of workers through the entire migration process. The types
of migrants covered range from skilled to unskilled and include
itinerant, project tied, those in specified employment, selfemployed migrant workers, and seasonal workers. Thirty-three
ILO Convention 143, at art. 3.
ILO Convention 143, at Part II.
66 Bohning, supra note 61, at 699.
67 Id. at 700.
68 Ratifications of C143-Migrant Workers (Supplemental Provisions) Convention,
LABOUR
ORG.,
1975
No.
143,
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P
11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312288:NO.
69 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICMR].
64
65
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states are currently signatories of the ICMR.
Comprised of nine sections, the ICMR is considered the first
comprehensive codification of the rights of migrant workers and
their families in a single human rights instrument. Article 1
provides a broad definition of migrant workers, including a
distinction between regular (documented) workers and irregular
(undocumented) workers. 70 Article 7 sets forth a principle of nondiscrimination—providing that States should enforce the rights
contained in the Convention without distinction. 71 Part III of the
ICMR (Articles 8–35) grants broad human rights to all migrant
workers and members of their families, irrespective of their
migratory status. 72 Article 37 confers additional rights for migrant
workers who are documented or regular. 73 Part VI provides a
framework for international migration particularly oriented
toward eliminating trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Finally,
Article 72 requires that implementation of the ICMR be monitored
by the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families. 74
The last of the seven core UN international human rights
treaties that together form the United Nations human rights treaty
system, the ICMR is smaller than the other conventions and was
not initially given immediate priority or widely promoted. 75
Beginning in the late 1990’s, however, the ICMR gained authority
due to a confluence of factors. These factors include establishment
of the Steering Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification
of the ICMR, an alliance involving the UN Secretariat,
intergovernmental agencies and international human rights,
church, labor, migrant, and women’s organizations.
First
convened in 1998, the work of the Steering Committee has led to a
sharp increase in the number of ratifications and signatures to the
See ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 1.
ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 7.
72 ICMR, supra note 69, at arts. 8-35.
73 ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 37.
74 See ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 72 (discussing implementation measures
for the convention, including discussion of a committee for monitoring purposes).
75 Robyn Iredale & Nicola Piper, UNESCO Int’l Migration & Multicultural
Policies Sec., Identification of the Obstacles to the Signing and Ratification of the UN
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers: The Asia-Pacific
Perspective 13, in UNESCO SERIES OF COUNTRY REPORTS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE
UN
CONVENTION
ON
MIGRANTS
(Oct.
2003),
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139528e.pdf.
70
71
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ICMR—prior to 1998 only nine states had ratified the
Convention. 76
Additionally, the first UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights of Migrants was appointed in 1999. 77 The Special
Rapporteur is charged with receiving information from migrants
concerning violations of their rights, issuing recommendation to
correct such violations, promoting the application of international
legal instruments and recommending policies to advance migrants
rights at the national, regional and international levels. 78
Finally, increased support for the ICMR can be attributed to
“intensified civil society activism, notably in Asia which has the
most advanced migrant worker NGOs and regional networks.” 79
The Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) was established in 1994,
following the First Regional Conference organized by the Asian
Migrant Centre in Hsinchu, Taiwan. 80 Initially meant to serve as a
mechanism to monitor the implementation of conference
recommendations, it has since evolved into a regional network that
provides advocacy and direct services to migrant workers in all
phases of the migration cycle. 81 The broadest regional network
dedicated to advancing migrants rights, the MFA is comprised of
23 member organizations, including migrant workers associations
and unions, NGOs, religious organizations, national networks, and
women’s NGOs. Member organizations represent 5 labor-sending
countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri
Lanka; and 5 labor-receiving countries—Hong Kong, Japan,
Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan. 82
2.3. Relationship Between ILO Conventions and the UN International
Convention on Protection of All Migrants Workers and Members
of Their Families
Due in part to ILO participation in the drafting of the ICMR,
76
OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON MIGRANT WORKERS AND ITS COMMITTEE: FACT SHEET NO. 24 (REV. 1),
at 3 (2005) [hereinafter ICMR Fact Sheet].
77 Id. at 14.
78 Id.
79 Iredale & Piper, supra note 75, at 13.
80
Mary Lou L. Alcid, The Multilevel Approach to Promoting Asian Migrant
Workers’ Rights: The MFA Experience, 42 INT’L MIGRATION 169, 171-72 (2004).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 172.
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there is significant overlap between the ICMR and ILO instruments
safeguarding migrant’s rights. Of the 27 substantive Articles in
Part III of the ICMR, 15 are covered by ILO Conventions or
Recommendations; of the twenty substantive Articles in Part IV, 17
are covered by ILO Conventions and Recommendations; and,
finally, of the 8 substantive Articles in Part VII, 6 are covered by
existing ILO standards. 83
With regard to conflict between ILO instruments and the
ICMR, the progressive development of human right standards
requires that later instruments more favorable to individuals be
adopted over earlier ones. 84 Accordingly, when in conflict, the
ICMR supersedes preexisting ILO standards. Conflict between
ILO instruments and the ICMR are most pronounced with respect
to social security and free choice of employment. 85
2.4. Status of Trainees Under International Human Rights Law
Trainees fall within the definition of “migrant for employment”
under the ILO Migrant Workers Convention, No. 97. 86 The ICMR
broadens this definition, defining a migrant worker as “a person
who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national.” 87 While these definitions imply inclusion of trainees
who engage in labor for remuneration, both the ILO Migrant
Workers Convention (Supplementary Provisions), No. 143 and the
ICMR contain explicit provisions that exclude “trainees” from
protection. 88
This explicit contradiction does not, however, necessarily
foreclose protection under international law for trainees who both
receive training and engage in remunerated employment. “The
complexity of the present day migration stream has intensified
with distinctions between migrant workers, trainees, tourists,
refugees and displaced persons becoming increasingly blurred.” 89
83
84
85
86
87
88

3(e).

Bohning, supra note 61, at 705.
Id.
Id.
ILO Convention 97, supra note 62, at art. 11.
ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 2(1).
ILO Convention 143, supra note 60, at art. 11(d); ICMR, supra note 69, at art.

89 Piyasiri Wickramasekera, Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an
Era of Globalization, Int’l Labour Org. International Migration Papers No. 57, 2
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With regard to trainees, this distinction is particularly tenuous
because “on the job training” is difficult to distinguish from actual
labor.
Challenges associated with distinguishing trainees from
migrant workers were raised during the United Nations Working
Group discussion of Article 3 of the ICMR. The Swedish
representative, during the discussion, proposed that students and
trainees engaged in remunerated work must be protected under
the ICMR. 90 Despite significant endorsement of this perspective,
the Working Group retained the wording “students and
trainees.” 91 Upon closing the session, however, a Finnish
representative provided the following definition of student:
The term ‘student’ refers to a person who has been
admitted to a state of which he is a national to pursue a
full-time course of studies; a student is a migrant
worker when he engages in remunerated activity that
is not considered to be part of his course of study in
that state. 92
Based upon these discussions, protection for migrant trainees
within Japan is consistent with the scope of the ICMR.
3. JAPAN’S NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO RIGHTS AT WORK FOR
MIGRANT WORKERS
3.1. Commitment to International Human Rights Instruments
Protecting Migrant Workers
Historically, Japan has maintained an ambivalent relationship
to international norms. Japan’s approach to international norms
“is not necessarily resistant to their content” but also “does not see
them as integral to state identity.” 93 Prior to 1979, Japan had

(Aug. 2002).
90 Yazuo Kitamura, Recent Developments in Japanese Immigration Policy and the
United Nations Convention of Migrant Workers, 27 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 113, 127
(1993).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93
See Amy Gurowitz, Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors,
Immigrants, and the Japanese State, 51 WORLD POLITICS 415, 424 (1999) (reaching this
conclusion based upon a historical analysis of Japan’s entry into international
society and themes in Japanese state identity dating back to the Meiji period).
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ratified only two international human rights agreements. 94
Following six years of intense, sustained pressure from Japanese
and international NGOs, in 1979, the Japanese government ratified
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). 95
Since 1979, Japan has ratified a number of additional treaties.
In addition to ICCPR and ICESCR, Japan has signed and ratified
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 96 Although there is no National
Commission for Human Rights in Japan, in the last fifteen years, a
number of agencies have been established to promote human
rights—the Promotion Council for Human Rights Education
(1995), the Council for Human Rights Protection (1997), and the
Human Rights Forum 21 (1997).
Despite this increased commitment to international human
rights, Japan has not ratified ILO Convention 97, Migration for
Employment; ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention
(Supplementary Provisions); and has taken a firm stance in
opposition to the ICMR. 97 In a statement issued in 1990, following
the adoption of the ICMR by the General Assembly, the Japanese
government expressed several reservations. These include concern
that the Conventions advocate more favorable treatment for
migrant workers than is currently legislated for nationals and other
foreigners; potential clashes with Japan’s Constitution; and
implications for Japan’s basic immigration policies. 98 In addition,
Japan usually follows international trends when ratifying UN
documents. Absent ratification from the G7 countries and other
Id. at 426.
Id. at 426-29 (tracing the political context and mobilization efforts in the
lead up to the ratification of these treaties).
96 Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry
of Justice, Japan, Addressing the Global Community: Section 1, Treaties and
International Conventions, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, 102-03, available at
www.moj.go.jp/content/000058062.pdf.
97 See Iredale & Piper, supra note 75, at 26 (noting the agreements Japan has
signed, which do not list the named documents).
98 Id. at 29.
94
95
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high-income migrant-receiving countries, Japan has not felt
compelled to ratify the ICMR. 99 Finally, the Japanese Ministry of
Labor typically discusses ratification of ILO instruments with trade
unions prior to recommending ratification and Japanese trade
unions have not made conventions safeguarding migrant workers
a priority in their advocacy. 100
3.2. Challenges to Accessing Legal Protection Under Japanese Labor
Law
The capacity for a temporary migration program to balance the
economic needs of the host country with the human rights of
migrant workers depends upon the fulfillment of three basic
prerequisites: first, a strong policy commitment to enforcing
immigration and employment laws, especially against employers;
second, active regulation of the cost at which migrant workers are
made available to employers; and third, effective mechanisms for
encouraging employers to search for local workers before
demanding migrant labor. 101 The first prerequisite relates most
directly to protecting rights at work for migrant workers while the
second and third variables are required to balance competing
claims to employment by nationals within the host country.
Maintaining a focus on advancing human rights protection for
migrant workers, this section considers the first prerequisite:
whether the 2009 revisions to Japan’s Immigration Control Act are
sufficient to demonstrate a strong national commitment to
enforcing immigration and employment laws, especially against
employers. More specifically, the question is whether extending
protection to trainees by considering them workers under the
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other laborrelated laws and regulations is likely to provide real access to
protective measures. I consider two dimensions of access to real
protective measures: first, access to legal services for migrant
workers in Japan; and, second, the viability of amended legal
sanctions against employers.
3.2.1. Access to Legal Services
Foreign workers in Japan typically do not receive legal
99
100
101

Id. at 27-28.
Id.
See Ruhs, supra note 4, at 16.
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counsel. 102 The most basic barriers to access include a lack of
financial resources and personal connections necessary to arrange
for legal representation. The challenge of securing legal counsel
under these conditions is heightened by a tendency by public
defenders to reject cases involving foreigners because they are
difficult, usually require interpretation, and offer little financial
reward. 103
Against this backdrop, most low wage foreign workers access
legal services through lawyers’ associations and legal NGOs.
Lawyers associations that provide legal counsel to foreigners,
include the Lawyers’ Association for Foreign Laborers Rights,
(LAFLR), The Lawyers Association for Foreign Criminal Cases
(LAFOCC), and the Immigration Review Task Force. These
associations receive basic funding for their activities from regional
lawyers’ associations. 104 Legal NGOs, by contrast, rely almost
entirely upon donations. 105 The authority wielded by employers
over the legal status of trainees places an additional burden on
lawyers associations and legal NGOs.
Trainees occupy a
particularly precarious immigration status. Placement with an
employer is a prerequisite to remaining legally in Japan, and the
only potential sanction for employers is to suspend permission to
receive trainees—resulting in immediate deportation for trainees
working with the offending firm. 106
Employers use this dependence to short-circuit
proceedings and avoid paying damages and back pay.

legal

When an intern or trainee goes to report unpaid wages
to the local labor standards bureau, there have been
many cases where they return to their domicile or
workplace to find someone from their hiring company
or association waiting to force them to return to their
home country, sometimes making them leave that very
102 Apichai W. Shipper, Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan, 79 PAC. AFF. 269,
279-80 (2006).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105
See Godoy, supra note 59 (“[T]he advocacy network relies entirely on
grass-roots support in the form of volunteers and donations . . . . [T]he network
receives no funding from the government . . . .”).
106 Matsubura, supra note 48.
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day. 107
In order to avoid these outcomes, legal advocates advise clients to
leave their place of employment early in the morning on the day
they make their report and stay in a shelter for the duration of legal
Advocacy groups who help trainees seek
proceedings. 108
reparation are, therefore, also required to provide shelter and
protection for their clients. In addition to trainees who must flee
from their place of employment to avoid deportation, trainees
whose contracts have been broken are evicted from the company
dorm and usually need a place to stay. 109 Adding to these
challenges, trainees who file claims against their current employer
may face intimidation and need protection. 110
3.2.2. Viability of Legal Sanctions Against Employers
While the 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act
included increasing punishments for employers who violate the
dictates of the trainee program, Japan is notorious for weak law
enforcement. In fact, it has been argued that no industrial nation
has weaker law enforcement. 111 “Sanctions taken for granted in the
West, in Europe as well as in the United States, either do not exist
or remain unused in Japan.” 112
Consistent with this reputation, employers who act
inappropriately regarding trainees do not actually receive
punishment. Rather, they lose the privilege of receiving trainees.
The 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act does not initiate
additional sanctions. Instead, the revisions increase the period of
suspension from the program from one year to three years.
Typically, in Japan, the paucity of formal legal sanctions is
balanced, at least in part, by informal, extralegal mechanisms. 113
The most persuasive is ‘loss of face’ or damaged reputation. 114
Accordingly, as in most countries, adverse publicity is a powerful
Id.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 John O. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law
Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265, 265 (1982).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 275.
114 Id.
107
108
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tool in gaining compliance with legal and social norms. 115 In
addition, ostracism, including refusal to deal with companies that
violate accepted legal norms incentivizes compliance. 116
Unfortunately, even after the 2009 revision of the Immigration
Control Act, these informal, extralegal mechanisms for
incentivizing compliance do not enhance protection for trainees.
Justice Ministry investigations of trainee exploitation are rarely, if
ever, made public, even when such investigations result in
suspension from the program. 117 Hiroshi Nakajima, an organizer
for the Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees, 118 described the
investigation process as a “black box.” 119 According to Nakajima,
questions go unanswered during investigations and the resulting
suspensions are not even made public. 120 More alarmingly still,
this information is not always available to the public, even upon
request. “The network is sometimes able to get information on
banned companies from the ministry upon request, but not in
every case,” Nakajima explains. 121 Often, organizations that
advocate on behalf of trainees only know that a placement
organization, association, or company has been suspended when
they find out that the firm no longer receives trainees. 122
Local Labor Standards Offices, at least in Fukui Prefecture, also
fail to provide relevant public information. 123 In 2009, 85% of the
companies employing trainees that were investigated by the Fukui
Labor Bureau were found to have committed labor or safety
infractions. 124 By failing to make the names of offending
companies public, the Labor Standard Inspection Office protects
these companies from Ministry of Justice sanctions and allows
them to continue employing foreign trainees. These de facto
policies of shielding companies that violate the rights of trainees
Id.
See id. at 277 (suggesting that informal mechanisms of ostracism is one of
the most effective means of maintaining social order).
117 Godoy, supra note 59.
118 The Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees, started in 1999, is a Tokyobased umbrella organization for trainee advocacy groups. I discuss this
organization further in Section IV of this paper.
119 Godoy, supra note 59.
120 Id.
121
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
115
116
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from public humiliation undermine the potential for extralegal
sanctions to bolster the legal rights extended to foreign trainees.
According to Ichiro Takahara of the Fukui Advocacy Network for
Foreign Trainees, these policies trivialize violations: “The sense of
guilt over committing a labor violation is less than that over
committing a traffic violation.” 125
3.2.3. Evaluation by UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Migrants
Invited by the Japanese Government to observe and report on
the human rights situation of migrants in the country, in March
2010, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants,
Jorge Bustamante, spent nine days touring Japan. 126 Bustamante
visited Tokyo, Nagoya, Toyota, and Hamamatsu to meet with
Ministers, officials of central and local governments, international
organizations, lawyers, schoolteachers, academics, members of
civil society organizations, as well as migrant women, men, and
their children. 127
Despite the 2009 revisions to the Immigration Control Act,
Bustamante condemned the industrial trainee and technical interns
program. In his recommendations, Bustamente described the
program as “fuel[ing] demand for exploitative cheap labour under
conditions that constitute violations of the right to physical and
mental health, physical integrity, freedom of expression and
movement of foreign trainees and interns.” 128 In some cases, he
noted, these conditions “may well amount to slavery.” 129 In
addition, he recommended that “urgent measures . . . be taken
within the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to guarantee the
effective implementation of the rights of foreigners without
discrimination.” 130

125 Id. (quoting Ichiro Takahara of the Fukui Advocacy Network for Foreign
Trainees).
126 UN Migrants Rights Expert Urges Japan to Increase Protection of Migrants,
OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=99
50&LangID=E.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

4.1. Incentivizing Compliance with Legal Standards that Protect
Migrant Workers’ Human Rights at Work
Under the 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act,
Japanese employers who violate the human rights of migrant
workers do not actually receive punishment but only temporarily
lose the privilege of employing trainees for three years. This
sanction is further diluted by the association-supervised system of
placement which allows employers who have violated migrants
rights to apply to receive trainees by joining or forming a new
association that is not linked to previous abuses.
To facilitate effective enforcement of employer sanctions, two
conditions need to be met: first, implementation of employer
sanctions must be feasible; and second, there must be a strong
commitment to enforce the law against employers. 131
Intermediaries who help evade enforcement and insufficient
cooperation between agencies jeopardize the feasibility of
sanctions. 132 In addition, Japan’s notoriously weak culture of law
enforcement significantly decreases the likelihood of a strong
commitment to enforcing penalties against employers who engage
in misconduct.
To enhance the ability of sanctions to feasibly deter and punish
abuse of migrant trainees, small employers that band together to
form associations must be held individually accountable for abuses
against migrant workers. This requires the Ministry of Justice to
record sufficient identifying information about all individual
employers that comprise larger associations; the Labor Standards
Offices to report labor and safety infractions by employers hiring
trainees to the Ministry of Justice; and a joint commitment between
these agencies to insure that employers that engage in abusive
conduct are prohibited from joining associations in the future.
In addition, to compensate for Japan’s weak culture of law
enforcement, the Ministry of Justice must facilitate extralegal
sanction of employers who violate migrant’s rights. As previously
discussed, the paucity of formal legal sanctions in Japan is typically

131 Ruhs, supra note 4, at 17 (defining and applying these criteria to enforcing
government sanctions against employers who illegally hire irregular migrant
workers).
132 Id.
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balanced, at least in part, by informal, extralegal mechanisms. 133
The most persuasive is damage to reputation. Currently, however,
concerning abuses of migrant workers, adverse publicity and
refusal to deal with companies that violate the law are not effective
mechanisms for sanction because Ministry of Justice and Labor
Standards Office investigations of trainee exploitation are rarely
made public. Accordingly, to enhance the efficacy of informal
sanction, the Ministry of Justice must both make information about
violations available to the public upon request and commit to
publicizing investigations of employers that result in suspension
from the program. Access to this information will empower
migrant workers and their advocates to independently monitor
abusive employers and deploy public opinion to demand legal
compliance.
4.2. Recourse for Trainees: Portable Placements Within Sectors and
Approved Associations
One of the primary sources of migrants’ vulnerability within
temporary migration programs is the requirement that they work
only for the employer specified on their work permit. 134 As
previously discussed, under the 2009 revisions to the Immigration
Control Act, trainees continue to occupy a particularly precarious
immigration status because placement with a particular employer
is a prerequisite to remaining legally in Japan. Trainees who seek
recourse from Local Labor Standards Bureaus are frequently forced
to leave the country immediately. Employer accountability is
further undermined by the illegal practice of retaining migrant
workers’ passports and making accommodation contingent upon
submission to employer’s terms. 135
Access to legal recourse from abuse, therefore, “requires at
least some portability of temporary work permits . . . .” 136 While
unlimited portability of permits across occupations and sectors
might undermine alignment of temporary workers with industry
needs, allowing trainees to be mobile among smaller employers
within industry-specific associations maintains an appropriate
balance between the economic demands of the host country and
133
134
135
136

See supra Section 3.2.2.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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the rights of trainees.
In addition to providing trainees access to legal recourse, such
an arrangement would incentivize adherence to labor standards by
both employers and associations. If trainees are mobile between
employers in instances where their rights have been violated,
employers will have an added incentive to adhere to labor
standards in order to keep workers for a sufficient duration to
recoup recruitment and training costs. Moreover, requiring
associations to find new placements for trainees who have been
mistreated would require increased interaction between
associations and their members, increasing opportunities for
associations to monitor working conditions.
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